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ABSTRACT 
The ability of a government organization to evaluate and reward executive performance 
is of critical importance if performance management systems are realistically expected 
to promote successful execution of the organization’s strategic goals and objectives. 
Government organizations must move away from evaluating performance based on eq-
uity, time in grade, personal attributes and effort (all inputs) and toward systems based 
on output, results, and outcome achievement. We provide a model that can be used to 
evaluate executive performance in government. The model allows executives to focus on 
what is important to their organization and customers, and ties their performance 
evaluations not only to the organization’s objectives, but to the importance of each ob-
jective; thus it gives leaders an open and explicit linkage between performance of the 
individual and organizational objectives. We measure individual achievement by defin-
ing results or measures of performance and then aggregating them into higher-level 
objectives. We discuss how to use the model to rank performance among executives, 
how the model results might be used to reward performance and limitations of using the 
model for performance evaluation.  
 
EVALUATING EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The ability of an organization to evaluate and reward executive performance in the pub-
lic sector is of critical importance if performance management systems are realistically 
expected to promote successful execution of an organization’s strategic goals and objec-
tives. In this paper we provide a model that can be used to evaluate executive perform-
ance in government organizations. The model allows executives to focus on what is 
important to their organization and customers, and ties their performance evaluations 
not only to the organization’s objectives, but to the importance of each objective; thus it 
gives leaders an open and explicit linkage between performances attributes of the indi-
vidual and organizational objectives. We measure levels of individual achievement by 
defining attributes or measures of performance and then aggregating them into higher-
level objectives. We then show how to use the model to rank performance among ex-
ecutives and we discuss what the rankings mean, how they might be used to reward per-
formance and the limitations of using the model for performance evaluation. 
In Section 1 we review existing literature on performance based management and pay 
for performance. We include a discussion of the history and current initiatives tying pay 
to performance in the US government, and how pay for performance is being used in-
ternationally and at other levels of governments. We review relevant academic and pro-
fessional literature on managing employees, and begin to weave together ideas from 
practice, academia, and consulting to form the basis of our model.  
Section 2 builds on the literature and current initiatives to present a hierarchical model 
of objectives that may be used to evaluate public sector executive performance. We give 
examples of how the model may be used to determine an evaluation measure of per-
formance to compare employees across organizations. 
In Section 3 we examine in more detail what information the model provides to aid the 
evaluation process. We then return to the literatures on incentives and management, and 
discuss pitfalls that must be overcome in using this or any pay for performance system. 
We discuss the challenges of achieving consensus concerning performance metrics 
among multiple competing stakeholders. 
In the final section of the paper we summarize our model and consider future applica-
tions of the model in performance evaluation.  
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE 
Performance Management 
All over the world, and at all levels of government, Performance Based Management 
Systems (PBMS) are growing both in terms of their usage and their importance.  Terms 
like “performance management,” “balanced scorecard,” and “performance budgeting” 
spring up in all kinds of discussions on what it means to have an effective government. 
At national levels, governments and private institutions have embraced a performance 
management approach. Beginning as early as the 1940s, the Hoover Commission (1947) 
in the US began efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government.
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Today, the same ideas are at work all over the world. Kouzmin states that among na-
tions that comprise the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development is 
“the development of measurement systems which enable comparison of similar activi-
ties across a number of areas,” (1999: 122) and which “help to establish a performance-
based culture in the public sector” (1999: 123). In Australia, performance management 
pervades the Australian Public Service and calls for “the use of interrelated strategies 
and activities to improve the performance of individuals, teams, and organizations” 
(2001). The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, the Bush ad-
ministration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), and the President’s Manage-
ment Agenda, are just three of the current initiatives challenging US government man-
agers to focus on and be accountable for results.
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At local levels, many states and municipalities are also pursuing PBMS. Poister and 
Streib (1999) surveyed municipalities in the US and found that “some 38 percent of the 
[695] respondents indicate that their cities use performance measures.”
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 Murphey 
(1999) presents community-level data on performance in Vermont, Hatry (1999) reports 
comparative performance data among various government organizations and many oth-
ers in agencies across the world also track and report their performance measurement 
systems. (For a New Zealand example, see Griffiths, 2003, and for more international 
examples, see defense agency business and strategic plans in the UK, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand, such as http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/dpa/busplan02.pdf .)  
What is performance management? One definition is the systematic process by which 
an agency involves its employees, as individuals and members of a group, in improving 
organizational effectiveness in the accomplishment of agency mission and goals 
(www.opm.gov, see also OPM, 2002). Performance management applies to organiza-
tions, departments, processes, programs, products or services to internal and external 
customers, teams, groups, and employees, and can be used in private businesses, non-
profit organizations, and governments.  
Rather than focusing on inputs and work being done, then, PBMS push managers to 
measure and examine results. Systems, processes and employees, including employee 
evaluations, should be directed in the right way to the right things to achieve desired 
outcomes. Melese, Blandin and O’Keefe (2004) aptly summarize the set of performance 
management challenges faced by any government manager: to improve effectiveness, 
focusing on how well desired outcomes are achieved; to improve efficiency, focusing 
on how well the costs of producing goods and services are managed and, to improve 
accountability, focusing on bringing together budgets and performance measures.  
Given the overall climate for implementing PBMS, implementation of performance-
based evaluation systems for senior civilian executives is moving forward in the US and 
other governments. In the section below, we review the history of evaluating civilians in 
the US and combine the academic literature and several employee management strate-
gies from the private sector to provide the foundation for evaluating senior civilians. 
The intent of this paper is to model the methodology, taking some of the best of the pri-
vate and public sector work on performance and having it result in a blueprint for senior 
civilian evaluation in the public sector. 
Management of Employee Performance 
The execution of performance-based evaluation of employees lags far behind perfor-
mance-based evaluations for organizations in the government and private sectors, and in 
pay-for-performance schemes in the private sector. The Partnership for Public Service 
(www.ourpublicservice.org) reports that 90 percent of Fortune 1000 companies and 75 
percent of all US companies connect at least part of an employee’s pay to measures of 
performance, typically through bonuses and salary increases tied to individual perform-
ance. According to the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM), however, more 
than three-quarters of all pay increases for US federal employees are unrelated to annual 
performance evaluations and most agencies’ performance management systems fail to 
provide meaningful assessments of worker performance (www.opm.gov).  
With the current trend in business, nonprofit, and government to examine human capital 
strategy and provide a basis for performance evaluation in line with overall organiza-
tional strategy, many government agencies are turning to literature such as Nalbantian et 
al’s Play to Your Strengths, which advises management practices to secure, manage, 
and motivate the workforce to optimize business performance. The Center for Effective 
Organization’s Human Resources Metrics and Analytics Network is one of many or-
ganizations beginning to provide more concrete ways to combine performance man-
agement and evaluation systems of executives that tie organizational effectiveness to 
human resources (http://www.marshall.usc.edu/web/CEO.cfm?doc_id=5537). Our 
model provides a framework with which to combine performance evaluation and orga-
nizational effectiveness. 
US Historical and Current Initiatives 
In the US, starting with the Pendleton Act, or Civil Service Act of 1883 and continuing 
through today, the subject of employee performance management has received consi-
derable attention in federal government resources management. The 1912 First Law on 
Appraisal established a uniform efficiency rating system for all government agencies, 
and for fifty years, various acts provided for employee training, salary reform, and Of-
fice of Personnel Management (OPM) oversight of appraisal systems.
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Evaluation of senior executives in government was not considered separate from other 
evaluations until the late 1970s. The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act established a sepa-
rate performance appraisal system for Senior Executive Service (SES) employees and 
provided for performance awards for career executives. In 1985 the Performance Man-
agement and Recognition System implemented legal provisions for general, merit, and 
performance based pay increases, but was terminated in 1993. Today, in response to 
government managers’ concerns that current pay structures discourage results-oriented 
performance management, the US federal government is attempting to initiate pay-for-
performance systems such as MaxHR in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) in the Department of Defense 
(DOD). Current administration guidelines and regulations give federal agencies more 
flexibility to revise SES performance management systems and ensure a long overdue 
focus on results over process.   
Academic and Private Sector Literatures 
Behn (2003) and others suggest that public sector managers measure performance be-
cause it helps them tackle a set of specific managerial challenges, among them to eva-
luate and improve. Looking at new initiatives in government that tie pay to perfor-
mance, one sees an interesting “meld” of ideas from academic literature and private 
sector management. The academic and professional literatures examine characteristics, 
attributes, and other desired behavior of executives. Some researchers and practitioners 
discuss how attributes and characteristics might be tied to performance measures and 
reward systems, and some systems discuss the management of employees and tying 
decisions and behaviors to organizational objectives and outcomes. No study addresses 
how to effectively measure senior employees, including both attributes and results, 
while holding them accountable for organizational outcomes.  
Canice Prendergast’s (1999) seminal work on incentives and compensation, for exam-
ple, considers how pay-for-performance schemes affect employee behavior, and 
whether organizational outcomes improve with such schemes. While not specifically 
addressing government executives, many of her findings have implications in imple-
menting pay-for-performance systems in the US government. She asks: do individuals 
respond to contracts that reward performance? And, are individual responses in the 
firm’s interest?  
Prendergast reports that pay for performance does provide a strong output response. 
However, when the ability to measure output or send clear signals on how work effort 
affects output, pay for performance has not been shown to improve (or not improve) 
organizational effectiveness. Her thorough review of the literature concludes that the 
nature of the job carried out by employees, the extent to which they have discretion in 
their jobs, and the extent to which the measures used to pay employees truly reflect the 
inputs of effort, all affect the outcomes. In addition, she finds that multitasking in com-
plex jobs may cause executives to direct their activities towards those that are directly 
compensated. This may cause misalignment between the individual’s and the organiza-
tion’s goals.
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  While Prendergast thoroughly ties management of employees to organi-
zational objectives and outcomes, and discusses how some types of characters and 
attributes can be measured (or cannot, for complex jobs), she does not suggest a metho-
dology for evaluating senior executives or government employees. We will return to 
some of the findings of her study in section three, where we discuss implementation of 
our model.  
From the management literature, management by objectives (MBO) first outlined by 
Peter Drucker in his 1954 book, The Practice of Management, includes the concept that 
all managers of a firm should participate in the strategic planning process to improve 
implementation or execution of the plan. In addition, MBO requires management to use 
a range of performance management systems to help the organization focus on its goals 
and objectives.  
Using MBO principles provides much of the basis used in this paper to create a per-
formance management system for evaluating senior civilian government employees. 
MBO principles include cascading organizational goals and objectives, defining specific 
objectives for each member, including managers in decision making, using an explicit 
time period for performance and review, and providing evaluation and feedback on per-
formance. All of these principles are included in our model and implementation sugges-
tions.  
Our model also works well in the environment of a balanced scorecard management 
system. Balanced scorecard, originated by Kaplan and Norton (1996:2), promotes "a 
comprehensive framework that translates an organization's vision and strategy into a 
reasoned set of performance measures".
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 Cokins (2004:70) suggests that balanced sco-
recards, as part of the performance management set of tools, fosters cooperative and 
collaborative culture "where strategy implementation is managed not by senior execu-
tives but by the middle-level managers and employee teams that actually perform the 
work". Our model allows various participants to communicate about strategic objectives 
and performance issues. They can coordinate their actions in striving toward improved 
performance and subsequent alignment of work efforts with strategy.
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  As top manage-
ment rolls out its balanced scorecard, our model can be used as a means to communicate 
shared objectives; promote individual and organizational alignment by helping individ-
uals and departments align their goals with organizational objectives; build understand-
ing and acceptance of higher-level goals and objectives; engage managers to adapt the 
measures to fit their areas of responsibility; and track performance. 
Some critics of the balanced scorecard approach suggest that Kaplan and Norton in-
tended the balanced scorecard to be a tool for communicating strategy, and that it was 
not intended to be used as a personnel evaluation and compensation tool.
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 Meyer (2002) 
argues that forward-looking non-financial measures, essential for both strategic mea-
surements and appraising and compensating performance, cannot be combined into a 
single system used to compensate managers. Meyer seems to believe that continuous 
rebalancing of measures would indicate a moving target for a performance evaluation 
system. The school of thought, to whom he apparently subscribes, is that scorecards and 
pay systems do not mix. Another is that financial rewards are the most effective way to 
focus employee energies (Cokins:74). We agree with this latter thought, because with-
out an attempt to communicate and set measures (and the appropriate system to adjust 
them, when necessary), employee performance will not be directly linked to the 
achievement of strategic goals and objectives. We revisit the need for a flexible, adjust-
able system in the section on model implementation. 
Another approach, results-based leadership, also provides a somewhat parallel approach 
to our model. Results-based leadership focuses on attributes and results. Ulrich and 
Smallwood (2003) suggest that leaders must strive for excellence not only in terms of 
results against objectives, but by demonstrating attributes of success. Ulrich offers four 
criteria for judging whether managers are focused on achieving results: whether execu-
tives balance concerns of employees, the organization, customers and investors; whether 
results link strongly to the firm’s strategy and its competitive position; whether results 
meet both short- and long-term goals; and whether results support the whole enterprise 
and transcend the manager’s personal gain.  
This approach, like MBO and balanced scorecard, moves management away from 
thinking about inputs of leaders to the outcomes of their leadership. It provides a 
framework for measuring effectiveness of the leader. In their 1999 book, Results-Based 
Leadership, Ulrich, Zenger, and Smallwood provide a formula for measuring effective 
leadership. The formula is: Effective Leadership = Attributes x Results 
If a leader is measured on, for example, 10 attributes and 10 results, and is scored as a 
9/10 on attributes and 2/10 on results, then Ulrich et al suggest the leader’s effectiveness 
rating is 18 out of 100 rather than 11 out of 20. We suggest that our model provides a 
better way to measure effectiveness using results and attributes, if desired.  
Finally, a part of values-based leadership is useful in thinking about evaluation systems 
for executives. Values-based leadership is a multi-criteria analysis that includes the con-
cepts of creating value, managing for value, and measuring value. Achieving value, in 
this case, generally means something like maximizing shareholder value. Where this set 
of ideas applies to evaluating government executives is in its approach to balance. Pro-
ponents of values-based leadership say that three measures must be used to measure 
leader effectiveness: achievement of objectives (effectiveness), the desirability of any 
goal over the long term (time), and how change affects concerned parties (morality).  
We have included the first measure above, and in the model section discuss the applica-
bility of goals that do not have spillover effects on others, and the desirability of looking 
at long-term performance goals. We also allow an executive’s evaluator (which we as-
sume to be a top leader or senior executive as well) to weight goals and objectives, 
where long-term results and other attributes can be rated. 
Finally, a specific literature on the application of performance management systems and 
tools for public organizations provides some insight into how an executive evaluation 
system might be implemented. Poister (2003:159) notes that strategic management is 
responsible for the development of strategic plans, the implementation of strategic initi-
atives, and the ongoing evaluation of their effectiveness.  
Of particular interest for this paper is Poister's assertion that strategic management "re-
quires assigning implementation responsibilities for particular strategic initiatives to 
specific individuals and organization units and holding them accountable for the results 
(2003: 160). Monahan (2001) suggests that strong performance management can be 
achieved if leaders expect excellence, establish accountability, and take timely action. 
And Jones (2002:206), in his work on responsibility budgeting, notes that "all gover-
nance arrangements and administrative processes are primarily mechanisms for motivat-
ing and inspiring people, [. . .], to serve the policies and purposes of the organizations to 
which they belong". Our model incorporates each of these ideas, suggesting a tool that 
can be used to communicate, motivate, and reward executive performance.  
Literature Using Hierarchical Models of Employee Evaluation 
At least one study has contemplated using an analytic hierarchy process to improve hu-
man performance (Albayrak and Erensal, 2004). This research examines conditional 
(physical workplace and organization of work), individual (capabilities and attitudes), 
and managerial (leadership, company culture, and participation) attributes to try to eva-
luate alternative management styles and their effectiveness in improving employee per-
formance. This study is not specific to government organizations or executives, nor 
does it address the larger issue of tying performance to organizational objectives. 
In the next section we integrate the management of organization and executive perform-
ance by cascading goals and objectives from organization level to the executive’s areas 
of responsibility. Because individual decision making and accountability plays into the 
success of the organization, we explicitly model the decisions and actions of the execu-
tive, and how the results of an executive’s actions can be measured with regard to their 
value to the overall organization. We discuss implementation of the model, including 
difficulties with measuring outcomes, problems with subjectivity in analysis, and get-
ting people “on board,” in section three. 
 
SECTION 2: A MODEL FOR EVALUATING SENIOR GOVERNMENT EXE-
CUTIVES 
To help government executives find ways to reward performance with pay, this section 
develops a model to link performance to organizational outcomes. We begin by discuss-
ing organizational work that needs to be in place before a pay-for-performance system 
is implemented: a strategic plan that considers customers' and stakeholders' perspectives 
and strategic outcomes desired, and how the strategy will be executed. We then present 
our model, which illustrates a way to think about strategy execution with respect to 
measuring executive performance. Note that we use the term “executive” to mean the 
person, who is being evaluated, and “leader” or “evaluator” as the senior executive or 
leader responsible for undertaking the evaluation and overseeing the evaluation process 
of that executive.  
Before implementing a model to evaluate government executives’ performance, an or-
ganization must assess where it is and where it wants to be; it must have a strategic 
plan. The strategic plan presents the desired outcomes or results of the organization. 
Presumably, leaders at the very top of the organization have thought about the organiza-
tion's stakeholders and their performance expectations. They have identified organiza-
tional goals and objectives by answering questions such as: Who are the customers? 
What do they expect/need? Who are the suppliers and partners in providing services? 
How do beliefs and expectations of the workforce enter into success or failure of the 
organization? And, are there shareholders (policy makers, authorities, etc.) to whom the 
organization answers and whose issues affect the organizations' ability to "work better 
and cost less?" 
With a strategic plan in place, leaders may then turn to execution. One strategic issue is 
"how to get there" in terms of the human resources plan (Bryson and Alston (2004).Our 
model provides an execution "tool" to help leaders tie executive behavior to organiza-
tional outcomes.  
Executives are responsible for insuring that the organization succeeds; thus, their per-
formance must be measured relative to organizational outcomes – that is, vertical 
alignment of outcomes is necessary. Rather than focusing on competencies required, 
such as Homeland Security’s list of: “technical competence, critical thinking, coopera-
tion and teamwork, communication, customer service, managing resources, representing 
the agency, achieving results, leadership, and assigning, evaluating and monitoring 
work,” Executives need to be evaluated on the attributes that contributed to or results 
they achieved in light of organizational goals. In addition to vertically-aligned goals, 
horizontal alignment matters as well (Casey and Peck (2004)). Cross-organizational 
awareness can avoid situations where people with clear goals and the motivation to 
achieve them plow ahead, creating unintended negative consequences for others. 
How can horizontally and vertically aligned goals be created? Working together, senior 
leaders can associate organizational goals with results in terms of individual perfor-
mance (quality, quantity, cost, timeliness, etc.). They must go through an exercise, per-
haps iteratively, thinking about defining big results in terms of the aggregation of a se-
ries of smaller results.  
A performance-based evaluation system, then, should provide alignment from individ-
ual to top-level goals and objectives, and should consider spillover effects on others. It 
should help an executive focus on and understand how success on critical processes 
contributes to the success of the organization. We now present the iterative model, use-
ful for creating aligned goals and objectives for executives to meet desired organiza-
tional outcomes.  
THE MODEL: TYING THE STRATEGY TO PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The key to the development of a useful objectives hierarchy for an individual’s per-
formance evaluation is to tie specific elements of that executive’s performance (depend-
ent elements) to higher level goals and objectives of the organization. These elements, 
which may be characteristics, tasks, or outcomes at a higher level, must cascade down 
the hierarchy to measurable results or outcomes of effort or action. By tying organiza-
tional measures of performance to executive objectives, down to the level of measura-
bility on specific key factors, executives can see what is needed to “roll up” to success, 
both in terms of the executive’s evaluation and reward, but also in terms of achieving 
the organization’s higher-level goals and objectives. 
 Let us suppose that success for a service organization is defined through the 
achievement of the following goals: 
 provide responsive, best value services consistently to customers 
 structure internal processes to deliver customer outcomes effectively and effi-
ciently 
 make sure the workforce is empowered and enabled to deliver services both 
now and into the future, and  
 manage resources for best customer (or taxpayer) value 
 The top level of the hierarchy, then, is stated here in terms of goals. 
Figure 1: Top-level goals for success of the organization 
 
As in our example, the top level of most evaluation models is likely to be quite general. 
The organization employs the senior executive to help maximize the organization’s ef-
fectiveness, achieving the desired outcomes with regard to the organization’s mission, 
vision, values, and top-level goals and objectives. From the strategic planning process 
down through execution, the hierarchical model developed by the leaders and executive 
shows the path or flow of results that must happen in order for the individual and the 
organization to be successful.   
An executive might then break each of these down further by suggesting how the goals 
might be achieved. This is the point where stating objectives (performance measures) 
becomes more detailed and complex. Rather than stating qualities of the executive, such 
as leadership, the hierarchical process must drive executives to define performance 
measures that really matter – that is, measures that are measurable and realistic. The 
executive being evaluated should define how to do the work, and, with top leadership, 
together define what to do,
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 and how to do it. 
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 The executive, at this stage, might say 
something like, “I believe that we can provide responsive, best value services consis-
tently to customers if we can: 
 Provide an answer to their initial queries within 24 hours, and 
 Reduce levels of authorization to no more than three, and 
 Provide requested items within one week, within 5% of quoted price.”
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The second level may be obtained by formulating specific individual objectives. In our 
example, the three objectives that have to be met are framed as end states. Rather than 
holding an executive to 100% achievement of these, the objectives can be measured in 
terms of degrees of success. One measure or metric, for example, might be the percent-
age of initial queries answered within 24 hours. Figure 2 shows how this next level of 
the hierarchy may look. 
Figure 2: Second level of the performance evaluation hierarchy 
 
This may be the final level of evaluation for the executive on these tasks, where meas-
ures of success are defined by the percentages achieved. Or perhaps the executive and 
leaders continue down the hierarchy, where various tasks, responsibilities, and out-
comes that can be better evaluated are used and help determine what actions or strate-
gies “roll up” to meet organization and individual objectives.  
Pursuing detail in the sub-objectives at each level results in a relevant set of objectives 
for the executive. For each supporting objective, the executive and his evaluators con-
tinue to build the hierarchy by developing more detailed definitions of each objective. 
To evaluate effectively, the hierarchical process stops only when a way of measuring 
things becomes clear (even if it is subjective).  
Two examples illustrate how performance measures are used in the model. In the sim-
plest case, suppose one of an executive’s objectives was to reply to customer requests 
within 24 hours. If she met that objective 89% of the time, a score of 0.89 is applied. In 
a more difficult example, suppose an executives’ evaluator wants to measure effective 
communications.
12
 To determine if the customer or the executive’s boss thinks the ex-
ecutive communicates effectively, it may be necessary to collect information on typical 
measures of “success” in communication. These may be frequency of communication, 
accessibility of the information, content of the information, and the method used to 
communicate. (Because much of what a senior executive does is subjective, it is likely 
that some measures of performance will come from employee surveys or interviews, or 
subjective assessment of an executive’s skill or talent in executing the responsibility and 
achieving a desired result.) If the executive receives a subjective measure from the 
evaluator or through surveys with the customer of say, 75%, then a score of 0.75 can be 
applied to this “result.” In this way, attributes used in many areas (multitasking) can be 
accounted for and rewarded in some manner.  
This example shows that at each level of the model, each characteristic, task, or respon-
sibility desired fits under the purpose it serves. An effective executive is one who con-
tributes substantially towards achievement of the four top-level goals.  The model 
shows a method for drilling down to measurable objectives, where some of the objec-
tives can be subjective and measured in a way to quantify performance. 
To construct an overall measure of effectiveness (MOE) of an executive, the evaluator 
must have set priorities, or weights, at each level of the hierarchy. For example, if each 
of the four top-level objectives contributes equally to the organization’s success, each of 
them receives a weight of 0.25. Then, using the analytical hierarchy process, each at-
tribute or score is multiplied by the weighted objective to result in an MOE. For an ex-
tended discussion of the analytical hierarchy process, see the MOE literature; for exam-
ple, Miser and Quade, 1985, Keeney, 1992, or Keeney and Gregory, 2005.  
Again using a simple example, suppose an executive is held accountable for contribut-
ing to two higher-level objectives, X and Y. The executive and his evaluator have 
agreed they are equally important, so they each receive a weight of 50%. The executive 
is measured on his contribution to the success of each higher-level objective with one 
performance measure. The executive received scores of 90% and 70%, respectively, on 
the performance measures for achieving X and Y. The model for this executive would 
be as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Performance Evaluation Model for an Executive with Two Objectives 
 
The measure of effectiveness of this executive would be calculated as: 
MOE = 0.5(0.9) + 0.5(0.7) = 0.8 
Other executives could be measured by rolling up their performance measures in the 
same manner. An executive being evaluated on performance relative to three top-level 
objectives, with three levels in the evaluation system might have the model depicted in 
Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Performance Evaluation Model for an Executive with Three Objectives 
 
Again, at each level of the hierarchy, the evaluator and executive must agree on the 
weights or priorities. In this example, “to achieve” X, Y, and Z have priorities of 0.4, 
0.3, and 0.3, respectively. At the lower level, the performance measures for achieving X 
and Z have weights of one since they are the only measures. Since there are two meas-
ures for achievement on Y, the evaluator and executive had to set weights or priorities 
for those activities. Measure 1 was given a weight of 0.6 and Measure 2 a weight of 0.4. 
The measure of effectiveness of this executive would be calculated as: 
MOE = 0.4(1) (0.75) + 0.3[(0.6) (0.5) + (0.4) (0.99)] + 0.3(1) (0.83) = 0.76 
One of the strong points of this model is that a non-measurable, top-level goal (the “re-
sponsive, best value services provided consistently to customers” in this example) is 
translated to measurable objectives and outcomes with smaller results. At each level, 
results inform the others, and the clarity with which they are stated helps align actions.  
Another feature of this model is that it is robust: the organization and individual have 
worked together to either set or interpret organizational goals, and to make them worka-
ble for the executive ultimately responsible for their execution. And evaluation of ex-
ecutives can be easily understood not only by the evaluator and executive, but by other 
stakeholders. This approach allows top leadership to review the contribution of each 
executive in a more impartial manner, to compare similar executives, and to constantly 
evaluate whether their priorities are driving executives to make decisions in the interest 
of the organization. It also allows executives to constantly revisit their “priority list” for 
accomplishing results and to communicate with their superiors on whether there are 
issues that affect the executive’s (and organization’s) likelihood of making significant 
progress towards organizational goals. 
SECTION 3: IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL 
To begin to implement the evaluation model, leadership must have defined the organi-
zation’s strategic goals and objectives. Top leaders and the executive being evaluated 
must then focus on results, moving away from evaluating inputs, attributes, effort, and 
characteristics. Desired results must cascade from upper level goals to measurable out-
comes achievable by the executive being evaluated. Executives participate with leader-
ship to define and execute their own objectives in line with organizational goals and 
objectives. In advance of implementation of the evaluation system, leaders must also set 
up explicit time periods for reviewing progress and providing feedback. The system 
must also be flexible enough to allow leaders and executives to revisit their priorities 
and change the outcomes desired (or their weighting) as time goes on, in order to meet 
organizational objectives and evaluate the executive fairly. (For more on implementa-
tion of performance-oriented pay systems, see GAO-05-832SP.) The model can thus be 
adjusted over time, and can be used not only to evaluate, but to provide guidance, moti-
vate, promote, celebrate, and help executives learn and improve.  
This process will require substantial investment on the part of the organization. Top 
leadership must devote the time and energy necessary to transform strategy to goals and 
objectives for the organization to areas of responsibility for executives including spe-
cific goals and objectives. Any exercise setting up assessable measures of performance 
will likely be quite difficult, particularly in organizations where outputs, let alone out-
comes, are difficult to measure. In addition, even when all participants agree that meas-
uring outcomes makes sense, they may be less likely to believe that an evaluation sys-
tem could be derived that fairly measures results. Leaders must be ready for such criti-
cisms and be very clear about how their evaluations will be derived and used. As Wil-
liams (in Jones, 2002) pointed out, "performance measurement [. . .] is not a value neu-
tral technique. When performance ratings are revealed, it is the ratings that get attention, 
but it is the criteria that are important; that is where values are found." Whether leader-
ship quantifies results or not, the modeling process provides decision makers with value 
on structuring goals and objectives for the organization and executive to better achieve 
successful organizational outcomes.   
One of the steps of building the model that will require extensive leadership is provid-
ing not only vertical, but horizontal alignment of goals. If executives need to work to-
gether to achieve results across their organizations, but their objectives are not aligned, 
adverse outcomes may result because members of each team could view efforts as com-
petitive. Kelman (2005) worries about such negative effects that individual pay-for-
performance schemes could have, and says that success might not motivate the “win-
ners” as much as it would average performers, who “might lose their motivation if they 
fail to get performance bonuses.” And Prendergast’s review of studies suggests that 
average performers tend to think their performance is above-average. The evaluation 
system must be well-communicated to stakeholders and be transparent to help mitigate 
these incentive problems. 
Prendergast’s concerns about misalignment between the individual’s and the organiza-
tion’s goals must also be addressed. For many complex jobs like those in senior execu-
tive service, Prendergast suggests it is impossible to specify all relevant aspects of ex-
ecutive behavior in a performance contract. Even if specific objectives are established 
and the evaluation system is understood and transparent, an executive might be moti-
vated to “game” the system – that is, put more effort into the accomplishment of a high-
er-weighted objective – if doing so results in a higher evaluation score. This incentive 
problem has become known as multitasking, where compensation on any subset of tasks 
results in a reallocation of activities toward those that are directly compensated and 
away from the uncompensated activities (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990, Baker, 1992.)  
A common way to provide incentives when it is difficult to specify all aspects of em-
ployees’ jobs is to "use subjective performance evaluation, perhaps in addition to some 
objective assessments. [. . .] Such subjective assessments have the benefit that they can 
be a more fully rounded measure of performance; for instance, a baseball player could 
be rewarded for hitting a home run only if attempting to do so was warranted at the 
time.” (Prendergast, p. 9) However, there is considerable evidence that subjective as-
sessments also give rise to biases. Employees may be more likely to waste valuable re-
sources (work time, for example) currying favor with their bosses. Other problems may 
be “leniency bias,” where supervisors are reluctant to give bad ratings, and “centrality 
bias,” where supervisors compress ratings around some norm (Prendergast, p. 9). 
Because of the multi-tasking nature of many complex jobs, Prendergast predicts that in 
positions where there are significant opportunities for reallocation of activities, there 
will be an absence of pay-for-performance. In order for our model to work, leaders must 
pay particular attention to how outcomes are defined, what restrictions they place on the 
outcomes, and how they communicate what must and must not happen for the outcome 
to be achieved. (For more on conditions for success of pay for performance in the public 
sector, see Bohnet and Eaton, 2003, and Risher, 2004.) 
All of these concerns must be addressed. We believe, however, that our model provides 
a first step in thinking about how to link executive performance evaluations to organiza-
tional goals and objectives. In summary, as organizations begin to link evaluations to 
organizational accomplishments, their leaders must begin with strategic goal setting. 
For most government organizations, strategic goal setting must be responsive to multi-
ple stakeholders if the organization is to remain viable in the long run. We should rec-
ognize that these stakeholders often create conflicting pressures on the organization and 
its leadership thus forcing value tradeoffs to be made in order to balance these compet-
ing interests. Balancing these interests is a highly subjective process to be sure and 
the success of any government organization rests on leadership’s ability to generate 
“performance” value for each stakeholder over time.  
Especially at the strategic level of the organization, our model can help leadership to 
structure and think about this problem by making explicit the range of stakeholders, 
what their interests are, how important those interests are relative to the interests of 
other stakeholders and how those interests relate to organizational performance goals. 
Once this goal structure is made explicit and the relative importance of the goals is un-
derstood, organizations can more rationally direct resources toward goal accomplish-
ment and evaluate executive performance. To be sure, for a large complex government 
organization this will be a substantial and complicated undertaking but one that we be-
lieve must be attempted if performance management is ever to become a reality in the 
public sector.  
SECTION 4: SUMMARY 
The ability to link executive performance to strategic goals and objectives will be cen-
tral to the successful implementation of performance based management systems in 
government organizations around the world. Government organizations must move 
away from performance systems based on equity (equal across the board rewards), lon-
gevity (time in grade), individual behaviors, personal characteristics and effort (all in-
puts) and move toward systems that are based on output, accomplishment and outcome 
achievement if performance based management systems are to reach their full potential.    
The model introduced in this paper provides both a conceptual framework to achieve 
this linkage and the information necessary to construct an executive performance 
evaluation and reward system that is driven by results. The model recognizes that ex-
ecutives must focus not only on the hierarchy of goals and objectives for their organiza-
tion and stakeholders, but how important each objective is relative to the other objec-
tives. Within this framework, as leaders and executives work together to set goals and 
objectives and agree on what needs to be done to accomplish those goals and objectives, 
all parties should develop a better understanding of performance expectations and the 
metrics that will be used to evaluate performance. In the long run, individual commit-
ment and motivation should be enhanced as performance expectations and work roles 
are clarified. 
One of the most difficult tasks for leaders of government organizations is how organiza-
tion success is defined and measured. Increasingly, as the competition for scarce re-
sources becomes more intense, legislatures and taxpayers will demand increasing ac-
countability for organizational performance. Budgets will be linked to performance and 
organizational leaders will have to be able to demonstrate a high degree of transparency 
between funding (resources) and outcomes. The model described in this paper repre-
sents an attempt to make explicit these relationships and how executive performance 
can be evaluated in this context.  
Natalie J. Webb, Naval Postgraduate School e-mail: njwebb@nps.edu 
James S. Blandin, Naval Postgraduate School e-mail: jblandin@nps.edu 
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 “a significantly lower percentage than reported by some of the earlier surveys.” 
4
 For more on the history of employee evaluation, see 
http://www.opm.gov/strategiccomp/html/history1.asp. 
5
 See, for example, Kerr, 1975. 
6
 Our model supports the ability to meet targets for many high-level goals and objec-
tives by specifically helping to develop organizational capabilities in the quadrant that 
Norton and Kaplan call "learning and growth." By providing better measures of em-
ployee satisfaction and productivity, learning and growth goals and objectives can be 
better achieved.  
7
 Cokins (2004:74) also notes that there seem to be two schools of thought about 
whether scorecarding results in effectively managing a variable compensation incentive 
program. One school holds that performance management systems should not mix 
scorecards and pay because the formal linkage of scorecards and salary adjustments (up 
or down) is the "fastest way to ruin the sustained use of a scorecard system. The other 
school concludes that financial rewards are the most effective way to focus employee 
energies. Perhaps adding financial rewards will create the "fine gear wheels to assure 
essential organizational traction for the scorecard system, aligning people's work and 
accomplishments with the strategic objectives, vision, and mission." 
8
 Barr, S. June 30, 2005. "Homeland Security, Defense Asks Employees About Gauging 
Performance." Washington Post. 
9
 An even bigger problem with this list is “achieving results” is put on par with things 
like “critical thinking.” (Even the best leader can be a wonderful critical thinker, but not 
achieve desired results!) 
10
 Casey and Peck also note that this is human nature and not necessarily a reflection of 
individual shortcomings. They propose a way to formulate measures of performance 
that are horizontally and vertically aligned goals, where a measurable, results-focused 
objective is combined with a small number of corresponding restrictions. This very 
powerful tool allows managers to combine what to achieve with what not to achieve and 
provides a robust tool to formulate behavior. For more, contact Casey and Peck through 
Linda.thaut@elg.net.  
11
 Note: It is no coincidence that some of the wording in this section appears to take the 
approach of the Balanced Scorecard or other management “tool” with which to evaluate 
 
 
organizational effectiveness. The “four-pronged” approach of the balanced scorecard 
can allow managers to think about the aspects of their organizations that must be ad-
dressed to achieve desired results. 
12
 An important point about evaluating senior executives, however, is that many feel 
they do not need, or it is “impossible,” to structure goals on how to achieve a desired 
outcome. While micro-management of how to achieve the result is not desirable, every-
one can benefit from agreeing on what the organization is trying to do, and what the 
executive must do to make that happen. 
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